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We study international transmissions and welfare implications of monetary shocks in a two-
country world with multiple stages of production and multiple boarder-crossings of intermediate
goods. This empirically relevant feature is important, as it has opposite implications for two
external spillover e®ects of a unilateral monetary expansion. If all production and trade are as-
sumed to occur in a single stage, the con°ict-of-interest terms-of-trade e®ect tends to dominate
the common-interest e±ciency-improvement e®ect for reasonable parameter values, so that the
international welfare e®ects would depend in general on the underlying assumptions about the
currencies of price setting. The stretch of production and trade across multiple stages of process-
ing magni¯es the e±ciency-improvement e®ect and dampens the terms-of-trade e®ect. Thus, a
monetary expansion can be mutually bene¯cial regardless of its source or the pricing assumptions.
JEL classi¯cation: E32, F31, F41
Key Words: Vertical production and trade; Monopolistic competition; Terms of trade; Welfare
21. Introduction
Over the past several decades, nations have become substantially more interdependent through an
increased global interconnectedness along a vertical production and trading chain stretching across
many stages of processing, involving goods that cross borders multiple times. Feenstra (1998),
Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), and Yi (2003) analyze this
evolving nature of global production and trade, and argue that it may help understand many of the
phenomena observed in the past ¯fty years. For instance, Yi (2003) demonstrates that the multiple
border-crossings of goods embodied in a global production and trading chain is a key to unlocking
the mysteries of the large rise in world trade over the past half century and, in particular, the
non-linear pattern in this rise. Huang and Liu (2000, 2004b) show that incorporating a vertical
production and trading chain featuring multiple border crossings of intermediate goods into a
full-°edged DSGE model introduces a powerful transmission mechanism of shocks that may help
explain the quantity anomaly documented in the international business cycle literature through
reproducing some of the key stylized facts concerning cross-country business cycle correlations.1
The present paper seeks to explore the implications of this risen global production and trade
interdependence for the welfare consequence of international monetary policy transmission, an
issue that has long concerned economists and policymakers. Traditionally, the issue was analyzed
in the classical Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch framework. The new open economy macroeconomics
(NOEM) literature recently developed by Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995) and others emphasizes the
relevance of monopolistic distortions and nominal rigidities with local currency pricing, which
provides a micro-founded theoretical apparatus that is apt at carrying out the welfare analysis
in international macroeconomics.2 A domestic monetary expansion in these models typically has
two external spillover e®ects arising from international trade linkages for goods and assets: an
\aggregate-demand externality" and a \terms-of-trade externality." On the one hand, it alleviates
monopolistic distortions and thus raises output and employment to more e±cient levels for both
the source (home) country and its trade partner (foreign). On the other hand, it a®ects terms
of trade in favor of one country against the other depending on currencies of price setting: the
foreign's terms of trade improve if prices are set in sellers' local currency unit (SLCP), but worsen
1The relevance of focusing on production and trade in intermediate goods has also been suggested by Obstfeld
(2001, 2002), McCallum and Nelson (2000), Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2003), and Corsetti and Dedola
(2003). Yet, in these models, the imported intermediate goods cross border only once. In particular, the latter two
feature a non-traded distribution services sector which helps generate incomplete exchange-rate pass-through. As
we will show below, our model that features multiple border crossings of intermediate goods can generate incomplete
exchange rate pass-through and dampened °uctuations in the terms of trade even if all produced goods are traded.
2See, for example, Obstfeld (2001) for a survey of the postwar analytical thinking on the welfare analysis in
international macroeconomics and an assessment of the in°uence of Mundell and Fleming's work on the recent
progress in NOEM. See also Lane (2001).
3if prices are set in buyers' local currency unit (BLCP). Thus, while the e±ciency-improvement
e®ect tends to make both countries better o®, the terms-of-trade e®ect tends to make one country
better o® but the other country worse o®.
An important lesson from the NOEM literature, where all production of and trade in goods
occur in one stage, is that the con°ict-of-interest terms-of-trade e®ect tends to dominate the
common-interest e±ciency-improvement e®ect for many reasonable parameter values, under either
SLCP or BLCP.3 This gives rise to varying welfare results dependent of the underlying assumption
on the currencies of price setting.4
The main ¯nding of the current paper is that the multiple border-crossings of goods embedded
in a vertical production and trading chain, as is modeled in a full-°edged DSGE framework
here, magni¯es the common-interest e±ciency-improvement e®ect and dampens the con°ict-of-
interest terms-of-trade e®ect. As a consequence, a monetary expansion can be mutually bene¯cial
regardless of its source, parameter values, or the pricing assumption.
The basic intuition for the above result is that the increased global production and trade
interdependence in the form of a vertical production and trading chain makes the world economy
substantially behave as a closed one, whereas the only ¯rst-order welfare e®ects of international
monetary policy transmission are the ones associated with e±ciency losses due to monopoly power,
and whereas the terms-of-trade e®ects become only of secondary importance. To understand this
intuition, note that, on the one hand, with monopolistic distortions at each stage of processing,
there is a larger degree of production ine±ciency to be improved upon along a longer processing
chain, where this greater potential in e±ciency gain is materialized as upstream goods cross
borders downstream many times, multiplying the e±ciency gain at each stage.5 On the other hand,
the multiple border-crossings of goods also reduce the e®ective degree of market segmentation
and increase the degree of e®ective competition between home and foreign producers, making the
terms-of-trade e®ects muted. This happens since, given staggered price contracts at each stage of
processing, material costs and thus marginal costs rise less in the home currency unit and (due to
home currency devaluation) fall more in the foreign currency unit at a more advanced processing
stage, inducing producers at a later processing stage to raise their prices set in the home currency
unit by less and to lower their prices set in the foreign currency unit by more. With a greater
number of processing stages, the rise in the home price level becomes more sluggish and the fall in
the foreign price level becomes more pronounced, regardless of whether prices are set in sellers' or
3See Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Betts and Devereux (2000), respectively, among others.
4The real world features both SLCP and BLCP behaviors. See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000) and
Goldberg and Knetter (1997).
5As we will show below, the total markup distortion substantiated in the vertical production and trading chain
is not a simple sum but a compounded multiplicative of the markup distortions at di®erent stages of processing.
4buyers' local currency unit. In consequence, real aggregate demand and consumption rise along
with production by more in each country.
The pattern in price adjustments across di®erent stages of production and trade described
above also introduces a factor substitution e®ect, which is relevant for welfare since to produce
more consumption goods requires more labor along with more material inputs. As production and
trade move from less to more advanced processing stages, the pattern in the price adjustments
across stages makes material inputs increasingly cheaper than labor services, creating stronger
incentives for producers to substitute materials for labor. As a consequence, aggregate employ-
ment would not rise monotonically with the number of processing stages. With a larger number
of processing stages, relatively more goods would be used in producing goods while the terms-
of-trade e®ect becomes relatively less important, and households can enjoy more consumption
without necessarily working harder, which is welfare improving for both countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 describes
the welfare measure and experiment. Section 4 illustrates varying welfare results in a degenerate
version of our model with a single stage of production and trade. Section 5 presents the main
results in the model with multiple stages of production and trade. Section 6 concludes. We focus
on explaining intuitions in the main text and relegate analytical results and derivations or proofs
to the Appendix.
2. A Model with Multiple Stages of Production and Trade
Consider a discrete-time, two-country world economy, with a home country and a foreign country.
Each country is populated by an in¯nitely-lived representative household. Each household derives
utility from consumption of ¯nished goods, real money balances, and leisure. Production of
consumption goods in each country needs to go through N ¸ 1 stages of processing. In particular,
production of ¯nished goods requires labor supplied by domestic households and intermediate
inputs supplied by domestic and foreign producers. Production of intermediate goods requires
labor and less processed intermediate inputs supplied by domestic and foreign ¯rms, and so on.
Production of raw materials requires only domestic labor input. At each processing stage, there
is a continuum of ¯rms indexed in the interval [0;1], each producing a di®erentiated good. Labor
market is perfectly competitive and goods markets are monopolistically competitive. Firms at each
processing stage set prices in a staggered fashion in the spirit of Taylor (1980).6 While all goods
are tradable, labor is immobile across countries. The households have access to a complete set of
6We assume staggered price contracts rather than the standard (and simpler) predetermined prices since, as
we show below, the propagation mechanism of the model with multiple stages of production and trade relies on
unsynchronized price setting at least among ¯rms at some processing stages.
5state-contingent nominal bonds denominated in the home currency unit.7 Figure 1 illustrates the
production and trading structure of this world economy.
2.1. Preferences and technologies
We focus on presenting the economic environment in the home country. The representative














where Ct denotes consumption, Mt= ¹ PNt denotes real money balances, Lt denotes labor supply,
¯ 2 (0;1) is a subjective discount factor, and E is an expectation operator. Note that the linearity
of the period utility function in labor hours is a consequence of aggregation when labor is assumed
to be indivisible and such a utility function is consistent with any labor supply elasticity at the
individual level.
The household faces a sequence of budget constraints
¹ PNtCt + EtDt;t+1Bt+1 + Mt · WtLt + ¦t + Bt + Mt¡1 + Tt; (2)
where Bt+1 is a state-contingent bond, Dt;t+1 is the price of the bond, Wt is the nominal wage
rate, and Tt is a lump-sum transfer from the domestic government.
The consumption good is a composite of ¯nal goods produced at stage N by domestic as well






























µ¡1 is a composite of imported ¯nal goods. The parameter µ measures
the elasticity of substitution between di®erentiated goods produced within a country; while ´
is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in di®erent countries. Given µ and ´,
the parameter 1 ¡ ° determines the steady-state ratio of imports to domestic output. To ensure
existence of equilibrium under monopolistic competition, we assume that µ > 1.
The household maximizes utility subject to (2)-(3) and a borrowing constraint Bt ¸ ¡ ¹ B for
some large positive number ¹ B, for each t ¸ 0, with initial conditions M¡1 and B0 given. From












7This implies that monetary shocks have no permanent e®ect on current account balances, which helps simplify
the welfare analysis. See, also, Devereux and Engel (1998, 1999) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002).
6Y d













1¡µ is a price index of stage-N goods produced and used in the




1¡µ a price index of stage-N goods made in the foreign
country and sold to the home country. The overall price level in the home country is an average










To produce a ¯nal good requires primary factors (i.e., labor in this model) and intermediate
goods produced at stage N ¡ 1 (by domestic as well as foreign producers); to produce a stage-
(N¡1) intermediate good requires primary factors and less-processed intermediate goods produced
at stage N ¡ 2; and so on. In general, the production function for a ¯rm i 2 [0;1] at stage
n 2 f2;:::;Ng is given by
Ynt(i) = ¹ Yn¡1;t(i)ÁLnt(i)1¡Á; (7)




























µ¡1. The output is ei-
ther sold in the home market or exported to the foreign market so that Yn(i) = YnH(i) + Y ¤
nH(i).
The production of raw materials at stage n = 1 requires only labor input, with a linear production
function given by Y1(i) = L1(i), where the output is either sold to the home market or exported
so that Y1(i) = Y1H(i) + Y ¤
1H(i).
2.2. Optimal price-setting rules
Firms are monopolistic competitors in output markets and price-takers in input markets. In each
period, a fraction 1=2 of home producers at a given stage n 2 f1;¢¢¢;Ng can adjust prices. Once
a new price is set, it remains in e®ect for 2 periods. We sort the indices of ¯rms at each stage
so that those indexed by i 2 [0;1=2] set prices in even periods of time and those indexed by
i 2 (1=2;1] set prices in odd periods.8
We consider the welfare implications of our model under two alternative pricing policies. In one
scenario, prices are rigid in sellers' local currency, so that changes in nominal exchange rate would
be completely passed through; in the other scenario, prices are rigid in buyers' local currency, and
exchange rate pass-through might be incomplete.
8We restrict our attention to two periods of price-setting contracts to keep analytical tractability in our analysis
below. Allowing for price contracts to last for more than two periods does not alter the qualitative transmission
mechanism embodied in the vertical production and trading chain.
72.2.1. Sellers' local currency pricing
We now derive the optimal pricing decisions when prices are set in sellers' local currency. In this
case, the law of one price (LOOP) holds not only for each individual type of goods, but also for
the composite goods produced at each stage. Denote by Et the nominal exchange rate (measured
by home currency units per unit of foreign currency). Then the LOOP implies that
¹ PnHt = Et ¹ P¤
nHt; ¹ PnFt = Et ¹ P¤
nFt; (8)
for all n 2 f1;:::;Ng, where ¹ PnHt and ¹ PnFt denote the home price indices of goods produced by
home ¯rms and by foreign ¯rms, respectively, and ¹ P¤
nHt and ¹ P¤
nFt are the corresponding foreign
price indices. It is worth noting that, since home goods and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes,
the purchasing power parity in general fails to hold, that is, ¹ Pnt 6= Et ¹ P¤
nt unless ° = 1=2, in which
case, there is no steady-state home-bias.
If a home ¯rm i 2 [0;1] at stage n 2 f1;:::;Ng can set a new price, it chooses a price PnHt(i)




Dt;¿[PnHt(i) ¡ Vn¿(i)]Y d
n¿(i); (9)
taking the unit cost function Vn¿(i) and the demand function Y d
n¿(i) = Y d
nH¿(i)+Y ¤d
nH¿(i) as given.
The unit cost for a ¯rm at stage 1 is simply the nominal wage rate since labor is the only
input at that stage. That is,
V1(t) ´ V1(i;t) = W(t): (10)
The unit cost for a ¯rm at stage n ¸ 2 is derived from minimizing the cost ¹ Pn¡1¹ Yn¡1 + WLn
subject to the production function (7), and is given by
Vn(t) ´ Vn(i;t) = ~ Á ¹ Pn¡1(t)ÁW(t)1¡Á; (11)
where ~ Á = Á¡Á(1 ¡ Á)¡(1¡Á) is a constant and ¹ Pn¡1(st) is the price index of all goods produced


















1¡µ are the price indices of home
goods and of imported goods, respectively.



































8where n 2 f1;¢¢¢;N ¡ 1g. Equation (13) says that the demand for a type i good produced at
stage n will be higher if its price relative to the price index of all such goods is lower, if the price
index of these goods relative to the overall price index of stage-n goods is lower, or if the cost
of materials relative to the cost of labor is lower. The demand function in (14) can be similarly
interpreted.













where n 2 f1;:::;Ng. The pricing rule in (15) says that the optimal price set by a home ¯rm
is a constant markup over a weighted average of the ¯rm's two-period expected marginal costs.
The weights are normalized quantities of demand for its products in the corresponding periods.
Similarly, a foreign ¯rm who can set a new price will set its price, P¤
nFt(i), as a markup over a
weighted average of its current and expected future marginal costs.
2.2.2. Buyers' local currency pricing
We now consider the case where ¯rms can price-discriminate markets in di®erent countries and
set prices in buyers' local currency. In this case, the law of one price in general does not hold.
When a home ¯rm i can set new prices, it chooses prices PnHt(i) for its products to be sold in the
home market, and P¤
nHt(i) for those to be exported, to maximize the present value of its expected
pro¯t in the current and the next periods, taking the demand functions in each market as given.




Dt;¿f[PnHt(i) ¡ Vn¿(i)]Y d
nH¿(i) + [EtP¤
nHt(i) ¡ Vn¿(i)]Y ¤d
nH¿(i)g; (16)
where Y d
nH(i) is the domestic demand for the ¯rm's product given by (13), and Y ¤d
nH(i) is the
foreign's demand for the ¯rm's product, given by the foreign counterpart of (14).


























where n 2 f1;:::;Ng. The optimal pricing decisions by ¯rms in the foreign country (i.e., the
choices of P¤
nFt(i) and PnFt(i)) can be similarly derived.
92.3. Monetary policy, market clearing, and equilibrium
The monetary authority in each country injects newly created money through lump-sum transfers
to the representative domestic household, so that




The stocks of money supply grow according to Mt = ¹tMt¡1 and M¤
t = ¹¤
tM¤
t¡1, where the money
growth rates ¹t and ¹¤
t follow stationary stochastic processes.9












market clearing implies that Bt + B¤
t = 0.
An equilibrium for this economy is a collection of allocations and prices such that (i) taking
wages and prices as given, each household's allocations solve its utility maximization problem; (ii)
taking wages and all prices but its own as given, each ¯rm's allocations and prices solve its pro¯t-
maximization problem; (iii) markets for labor, money, and bonds clear; (iv) monetary policies are
as speci¯ed.
In what follows, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all ¯rms in a given price-setting
cohort make identical pricing decisions. In such an equilibrium, ¯rms are identi¯ed by the country
in which they operate, the stage at which they produce, and the time at which they can change
prices. Thus, from now on, we drop the individual ¯rm index i, and denote by, for example,
PnH(t) the price set for the home market by a ¯rm that operates in the home country, produces
at stage n, and gets the chance to change its price at time t. We log-linearize the equilibrium
conditions around a balanced-trade steady state and use lowercase letters to denote log-linearized
variables. The log-linearized equilibrium conditions under sellers' local currency pricing (SLCP)
and under buyers' local currency pricing (BLCP) are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
3. The Nature of the Welfare Experiment
To put our welfare analysis into context, we consider a unilateral monetary expansion in the home
country, under which mt = 1 and m¤
t = 0 for all t. We de¯ne the welfare in a country as the
present value of the life-time utility of its representative household. In the spirit of Lucas (1987),
Cooley and Hansen (1989), and Betts and Devereux (2000), we use a consumption-equivalence
9To keep in line with the literature [e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995)], we choose to focus on exogenous changes
in money supply growth as a source of monetary shocks. This is not our literal interpretation of how monetary
policy has actually been conducted in the United States or its trading partners. Some have argued that simple
interest rate rules such as a Taylor rule can better describe the US monetary policy. In our model with perfect
foresight, there is a one-to-one mapping between money growth and nominal interest rate. But it is not clear how
to draw a similar mapping between exogenous money growth rule and endogenous interest rate rules. In our view,
this issue in itself is important enough to deserve an investigation in another paper.
10measure as a welfare metric. We gauge the welfare gain in each country from the home monetary
expansion by the percentage increase in its representative household's steady-state consumption
that would make the household indi®erent between the cases with and without the expansion.
Speci¯cally, the welfare gain in the home country is given by the percentage change in the home

























where the variables with time-subscripts denote the equilibrium values in the presence of the
monetary expansion, and those without the subscripts denote the corresponding steady-state
values. In terms of log-linearized variables, the solution of ¢ is given by10
ln(1 + ¢) = (1 ¡ ¯)
1 X
t=0
¯t [(1 + ª)ct ¡ ·Llt]; (21)
The welfare gain in the foreign country can be similarly computed.
As we show in the Appendix (Lemma A.1), following the home monetary expansion speci¯ed
above, home currency depreciates fully (i.e., et = 1 for all t), the nominal wage rate rises immedi-
ately in the home country but is una®ected in the foreign country (i.e., wt = 1 and w¤
t = 0 for all
t), and nominal aggregate demand rises fully in the home country but remains unchanged in the
foreign country (i.e., ¹ pNt +ct = 1 and ¹ p¤
Nt +c¤
t = 0). These results obtain regardless of how many
processing stages there are or in which currency prices are rigid, since they are derived from the
representative households' optimizing behaviors. Yet, the real e®ects of money and therefore the
welfare implications of the monetary expansion do depend on the number of processing stages
and the currencies of price-setting. So we examine these di®erent cases in sequel.
4. Single-Stage Production and Trade: A Benchmark Case
This section illustrates the international monetary policy transmission mechanism in a benchmark
case of our model with a single stage of production and trade. We show that the international
welfare e®ects of the unilateral monetary expansion depend in general on the choice of the currency
at which price contracts are set. Since this benchmark case model with a single stage of processing
is familiar in the literature, we focus here on the main results, and relegate the details of derivations
to the Appendix (see Section A.3).
10As in Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995), our model features monopolistic competition that creates a ¯rst-order dis-
tortion, the e®ect of which on welfare would dominate those of higher-order distortions for small shocks. Thus, it
is su±cient for our welfare analysis to examine the ¯rst-order approximation of the equilibrium system following a
small shock. Woodford (2003) describe scenarios in which second-order approximations are appropriate. See, also,
Pappa (2004) for second-order approximations for welfare analysis in an open-economy setup. We are grateful to
Chris Sims for useful discussions on related subjects.
114.1. Welfare implication of sellers' local currency pricing
We ¯rst examine the case with sellers' local currency pricing. In the Appendix, we show that the
welfare gains in the two countries following the home country's unilateral monetary expansion are
given by




°(1 + ª) ¡
1
¹
[1 + 2(´ ¡ 1)°(1 ¡ °)]
¾
; (22)
ln(1 + ¢¤) =
1 ¡ ¯
2
[(1 ¡ °)(1 + ª) + 2(´ ¡ 1)°(1 ¡ °)=¹]: (23)
Given that 0 < ¯ < 1, whether a country is better o® or worse o® depends on the parameters ´,
the elasticity of substitution between home goods and foreign goods; °, the steady-state share of
domestically produced goods in total output (so that 1¡° measures the degree of openness); and
¹, the steady-state markup by monopolistically competitive ¯rms within each country.11
In light of (23), it is theoretically possible for the home monetary expansion to reduce the
foreign country's welfare (for example, when ° is close to one and ´ close to zero). Yet, under
empirically plausible parameter values, in particular, with ´ ¸ 1 (e.g., Backus, et al. 1995), the
foreign country tends to gain from the home monetary expansion. In contrast, as in light of (22),
the monetary expansion can reduce the home country's welfare for reasonable parameter values.
For example, given ´ ¸ 1, home welfare falls if ° · 1=¹. Thus, the monetary expansion may
have a \beggar-thy-self" e®ect for small values of ° and ¹. Further, a larger value of ´ also tends
to reduce the welfare. These results conform to the ¯nding by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), who
assume a value of ´ equal to 1.12
While the home monetary expansion raises consumption and real money balances in the home
country, the country's terms-of-trade deteriorates under SLCP. The worsened terms of trade tend
to reduce the home country's real purchasing power and to force its household to work harder
to meet the increased world demand for its products. While the increased consumption and real
money balances tend to raise the country's welfare, the increased labor e®orts tend to reduce it.
The fall in welfare becomes more likely, the larger the steady-state degree of openness (measured by
1¡°), the smaller the home ¯rms' monopoly power (measured by ¹), or the greater the elasticity
of substitution between home goods and foreign goods (measured by ´). The foreign country
gains as long as ´ ¸ 1 since the home monetary expansion not only raises foreign consumption
and real money balances, it also improves the foreign's terms of trade, and thus reduces the world
demand for its goods, resulting in lowered labor e®orts. In the Appendix, we provide closed-form
expressions for consumption and employment that make these e®ects transparent.
11The parameter ª measures the importance of real money balances in the utility function, and its value is
typically small in light of studies on money demand (e.g., Chari, et al. 2000).
12They also assume that the two countries may have di®erent degrees of steady-state home-bias (i.e., the °'s may
di®er across countries).
124.2. Welfare implication of buyers' local currency pricing
Under BLCP, as we show in the Appendix, the international welfare e®ects of the monetary
expansion are given by

















Clearly, with reasonable parameter values, the monetary expansion in the home country raises its
own welfare at the expense of the foreign's. In this sense, it is a \beggar-thy-neighbor" policy.
The foreign welfare falls mainly because the home monetary expansion tends to worsen the
foreign terms of trade under BLCP. This is so because, under BLCP, the foreign's import price
index ¹ p¤
1Ht remains unchanged, while the rise in the export price index ¹ p1Ft does not fully catch up
with the home currency depreciation due to staggered price-setting. The loss in real purchasing
power resulting from the worsened terms of trade o®sets the gain in its labor income, so that foreign
consumption remains unchanged. With unchanged consumption and increased labor e®ort, its
welfare falls. In contrast, the home country's welfare improves because the monetary expansion
raises home consumption and also improves its terms of trade, so that its household can a®ord to
consume more without having to work too much harder.
4.3. Currencies of price-setting: ambiguous welfare results
To summarize, if all production and trade occur at a single stage, then the international trans-
mission and welfare e®ects of a country's monetary expansion depends in general on the choice
of currency at which price contracts are set. Sellers' local currency pricing has generally di®erent
implications from buyers' local currency pricing. Were we to view the model with a single stage
of production and trade as an appropriate theoretical framework for welfare analysis in an open
economy, the issue would boil down to an empirical question: Are price contracts set primarily
in sellers' local currency unit or in buyers' local currency unit? Existing studies reveal that both
types of local currency pricing are empirically signi¯cant (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000) and
Goldberg and Knetter (1997)). Thus, any welfare results obtained from a benchmark model like
this would have to be quali¯ed.
5. Multi-Stage Production and Trade: Resolving the Ambiguity
The main ¯nding of this paper is that, as is to be demonstrated now, when production and trade
need to go through multiple stages, the varying welfare results under di®erent assumptions on the
currencies of price-setting obtained from the degenerate case of the model may disappear.
135.1. Some intuitions
We start by providing some intuitions behind the transmission mechanism embodied in the vertical
production and trading chain. Our central idea is that, as production and trade are stretched
over a larger number of processing stages, the home price level will rise by less while the foreign
price level will fall by more, and over a longer period of time, resulting in a greater increase in
real aggregate demand in both countries following the home monetary expansion. These patterns
emerge in the adjustment of the price level and the response of real aggregate demand regardless
of in which currency price contracts are set. With a reasonable number of processing stages, the
increase in real aggregate demand and thus in production e±ciency can overwhelm the terms-of-
trade e®ect, leading to a welfare improvement in both countries.
The key to understanding the pattern in the adjustment of the price level is to understand how
marginal costs at di®erent stages of processing would respond to the home monetary expansion.
The reason why the upward movements of marginal costs in terms of home currency unit, and
thus the home price level, can be attenuated through multiple stages of processing is similar to
that in a closed-economy [e.g., Huang and Liu (2001)]. Brie°y, following a monetary expansion,
the cost of primary factors in the competitive factor markets increase immediately, so that the
marginal cost for ¯rms at the ¯rst stage rises immediately, forcing these ¯rms to change their
prices fully whenever they have the chance to renew price contracts. But ¯rms at the second
stage do not face a full change in their marginal cost, because the marginal cost of these ¯rms is
partly determined by the price index of the ¯rst-stage goods, and the price index records both the
prices newly adjusted and the prices ¯xed by previous contracts. Thus, these ¯rms at the second
stage do not have an incentive to adjust their prices fully even if they have the chance to renew
contracts. Likewise, ¯rms at the third stage face an even smaller change in their marginal cost
and thus have an even smaller incentive to adjust their prices, and so on.
In an open economy, a unilateral monetary shock a®ects marginal costs of production at
various stages of processing in each country not only through a®ecting the costs of primary
factors and the costs of domestically produced intermediate goods, it also a®ects marginal costs
through movements in the exchange rate.13 With multiple stages of production and multiple
boarder crossings of intermediate goods, marginal costs in the foreign currency unit and thus the
foreign price level would fall in response to a home monetary expansion, and the magnitude of the
fall would increase with the number of processing stages, regardless of at which currency prices
of traded goods are set. This feature allows the home monetary expansion to raise the foreign
13A special case of our model with two stages of processing extends the small open model in McCallum and
Nelson (1999) to a two-country environment, with intermediate goods crossing boarder once. As we show below, to
have a unilateral monetary expansion to bene¯t all countries involved, regardless of currencies of pricing, requires
multiple boarder crossings of intermediate goods.
14consumption and output, despite that the foreign money supply remains unchanged. Indeed, this
is a unique feature and the novelty of the our open-economy model. It is therefore worth spending
some e®ort to understand the intuition behind this new feature.
5.1.1. Sellers' local currency pricing
Consider ¯rst the case with sellers' local currency pricing. At the ¯rst stage of production and
trade, the optimal pricing equations in Table 1 imply that the adjustment of the prices set by
home ¯rms, p1Ht, and by foreign ¯rms, p¤
1Ft, are determined by the ¯rms' marginal costs, which
coincide with the domestic nominal wage rates. Given the patterns of nominal wage adjustments
demonstrated in Section 3, home ¯rms that can adjust prices will raise their prices fully, while
foreign ¯rms would choose to keep their prices unchanged (i.e., p1Ht = 1 and p¤
1Ft = 0 for all t).
Since half of the ¯rms in each country cannot adjust prices, the price index of home produced
goods does not rise fully until the end of the contract duration, and the price index of foreign
made goods remains at the steady-state level. In particular, we have ¹ p1H0 = 1=2, ¹ p1Ht = 1 for
t ¸ 1, and ¹ p¤
1Ft = 0 for all t ¸ 0. On the other hand, despite the unchanged price of foreign goods
in the foreign currency unit, the price of imported goods facing the home household increases
due to the home currency depreciation. The ¯rst-stage home price index thus rises, but does not
rise fully until the end of the contract duration because of staggered pricing-setting. The foreign
household faces a lowered price index of imported goods in the impact period since the prices of
these goods are only partially adjusted in the home currency unit and the adjustment does not
catch up with the home currency depreciation until the end of the contract duration. Given that
the price index of foreign produced goods remains unchanged, the fall in the import price index
in the foreign currency unit implies that the ¯rst-stage foreign price index has to fall.
At the second stage of processing, the marginal costs facing ¯rms at the second stage are
partially determined by the price index of all goods produced and traded at the ¯rst stage. In
the impact period, since the price index of stage-one goods partially rises in the home country
and falls in the foreign country, so do the marginal costs facing ¯rms at the second stage. Thus,
those stage-two ¯rms that can set new prices would choose to partially raise their prices in the
home country and lower their prices in the foreign country. With staggered price-setting, the
price index of stage-two goods (including both domestically produced and imported) must rise
by less in the home country and fall by more in the foreign country than does the price index of
stage-one goods. Further, the incomplete adjustment in the price indexes of stage-two goods will
persist for one more period than the price indexes of stage-one goods.
When there are three or more stages of processing, the same logic implies that the price index
of goods at a more advanced processing stage has to rise by less in the home country and fall by
more in the foreign country, and the incomplete adjustment of the price indexes would persist for
15a longer period of time than the price indexes of goods produced and traded at a less advanced
processing stage. Thus, the price level rises by less in the home country and falls by more in the
foreign country and becomes more persistent in both countries as the number of processing stages
grows larger.
5.1.2. Buyers' local currency pricing
Under buyers' local currency pricing, ¯rms can set prices in di®erent currencies for the products
to be sold in di®erent countries. For the products to be sold in the domestic markets, ¯rms'
pricing decisions under BLCP are similar to those under SLCP. When ¯rms set prices for their
goods to be exported, however, the pricing decisions will depend on the relevant marginal costs
that are need to be adjusted for currency units.
At the ¯rst processing stage, the marginal cost is given by the domestic nominal wage rate,
which we recall from Section 3 rises fully in the home country following its monetary expansion, but
remains unchanged in the foreign country. This implies that, with the home currency depreciation,
¯rms in the two countries face an increased marginal cost in the home currency unit but unchanged
marginal cost in the foreign currency unit. Accordingly, all ¯rms will raise the prices of their
products to be sold in the home market while keep unchanged the prices of their products to be
sold in the foreign market. It follows that there will be no change at any time in the price index
of stage-one goods sold in the foreign market, while the price index of stage-one goods sold in the
home market does not rise fully until the end of the contract duration owing to staggered pricing
decisions.
The unchanged stage-one foreign price index implies that foreign ¯rms at the second stage face
unchanged marginal costs and thus would choose to stay put even if they can set new prices. Yet,
the price index of stage-two goods imported from the home country falls in the foreign currency
unit since home ¯rms at the second stage faces a partially adjusted marginal cost in the home
currency unit and, given the home currency depreciation, a lowered marginal cost in the foreign
currency unit. The unchanged prices of foreign's domestically produced goods and the lowered
prices of its imported goods imply that the foreign price index of stage-two goods has to fall. As a
consequence, foreign ¯rms at the third processing stage face a lowered marginal cost and therefore
would choose to lower their prices as well. This, when coupled with the lowered prices of goods
imported from the home country, implies that the foreign price index of stage-three goods must
fall by even more and for a longer period of time than the stage-two price index, and so on.
5.2. Some analytical results
The patterns of price adjustments described above are formally established in the Appendix.
Speci¯cally, we show there that, following the home monetary expansion, the rise in the home
16price level becomes more gradual, the fall in the foreign price level becomes more pronounced,
and both become more persistent as the production and trading chain grows longer, and these
price adjustment patterns do not depend on the currencies of price-setting (see Lemma A.2 in
the Appendix). It follows that, with more stages of processing and trade, the real e®ect of the
monetary expansion becomes larger and more persistent in both countries. Denote by yNt the
response to the home monetary expansion of real aggregate demand (i.e., consumption in the
current model) in the home country and by y¤
Nt the foreign counterpart when there are N stages
of processing. The following proposition formally establishes the monotonic relation between N
and the responses of the real aggregate demand.
Proposition 1. In a perfect foresight equilibrium, the following inequalities hold for all N ¸ 1,
regardless of the currency unit in which prices are set:
yN+1;t > yNt; y¤
N+1;t > y¤
Nt; 0 · t · N: (26)
Proof. (See the Appendix)
5.3. Some calibrated results
The increase in real aggregate demand and hence in consumption as N rises tends to improve
welfare in both countries. But if the rise in N were also associated with large increases in labor
demand, as labor is an input of production at all stages, the overall welfare e®ect would seem
to remain ambiguous. However, as it turns out, this concern needs not be substantiated. As we
have explained earlier, the prices of goods at a more advanced processing stage rise less in the
home country and fall more in the foreign country, while the nominal wage rate rises fully in the
home country and remains unchanged in the foreign country. Thus, at a more advanced stage,
labor becomes more expensive relative to intermediate inputs, so that ¯rms would have a greater
incentive to substitute intermediate inputs for labor inputs. For this reason, changes in aggregate
employment in each country need not be monotone in N. In other words, a greater number of
processing stages would allow for more consumption goods to be produced in both countries with
a given amount of labor input, since ¯rms would rely on using more goods to produce goods.
This, when coupled with the monotonic relationship between changes in consumption and in N,
makes it more likely for the monetary expansion to bene¯t both countries.
Now, what about the terms-of-trade e®ect? This e®ect tends to bene¯t one country at the
expense of the other, and which country would indeed bene¯t from it depends on in which currency
price contracts are set. In the special case with N = 1, as we have shown in Section 3, the terms-of-
trade e®ect tends to dominate the e±ciency improvement e®ect so that the international welfare
implications of the home monetary expansion depend on assumptions about the currencies of
17price-setting. With a reasonable number of processing stages, however, the e±ciency improvement
e®ect is magni¯ed and the terms-of-trade consideration is made relatively less important. Under
plausible parameter values, the home monetary expansion improves the welfare of both countries,
regardless of whether price contracts are set in sellers' or buyers' local currency.
The remaining question is: How large is the number of processing stages required to generate
welfare improvements in both countries following the home monetary expansion? To answer this
question, we ¯rst calibrate the model's parameters, except for N, which we would treat as a free
parameter. We then compute the impulse responses of consumption and labor e®orts following
the expansion. Finally, we compute the welfare gain, as given by (21), and we plot it against N.14
We calibrate the parameters following the standard international business cycle literature.
We consider one period in the model as corresponding to one half of a year, so that there is a
minimum amount of exogenous nominal price staggering. Accordingly, the duration of each price
contract is equal to one year, as is consistent with the empirical evidence surveyed by Taylor
(1999). We set ¯, the subjective discount factor, to 0:98, so that the annual real interest rate in
the steady state is about 4 percent. We assume a zero steady-state in°ation rate, so the money
demand equation implies that ª = (1 ¡ ¯)=v, where v = ¹ PNC=M is the steady-state velocity of
money. Given the value of ¯, we set ª = 0:0084, corresponding to a steady-state annual velocity
of 4:8.15 The parameter · by itself is unimportant since what a®ects the equilibrium dynamics










where L is the steady-state employment. We set µ, the elasticity of substitution between goods
produced within a country, to 7, so that the steady-state markup [¹ ´ µ=(µ ¡ 1)] at each processing
stage is about 17 percent, which lies in an empirically reasonable range (e.g., Rotemberg and
Woodford 1997). It is easy to show that the steady-state employment ·L is a decreasing function
of N. The larger N is, the greater is the cumulative markup across stages, and the further lies
output below the e±ciency frontier, and thus the greater is the room for e±ciency improvement.
We next set ´, the elasticity of substitution between goods made in di®erent countries, to 1:5;
and °, the steady-state share of domestically produced goods in GDP, to 0:85. These values are
standard in the literature (e.g., Backus, et al. 1995). Finally, we set Á = 0:9, so that as N varies
14Details of the computation methods are available upon request from the authors.
15Here we use M1 as a measure of money supply to compute the velocity. The welfare results are not sensitive
to alternative measures such as M2 or monetary base.
18from 2 to 6, the share of total intermediate goods in gross sales across all stages of processing lies
in the range between 0:43 and 0:71.16
Figures 2 and 3 plot the impulse responses of consumption, aggregate employment, and the
period utility °ows in the two countries under the calibrated parameters and for various N, when
prices are set in sellers' local currency unit and in buyers' local currency unit, respectively. These
¯gures con¯rm our basic intuitions and the implications of our analytical results that the responses
of real aggregate demand increase with N, while the responses of aggregate employment need not
be monotonic in N due to the factor substitution e®ect. It is especially worth noting that,
under sellers' local currency pricing, foreign aggregate employment falls because of its improved
terms of trade. The fall in foreign employment is more pronounced, the larger is the number of
processing stages, because, as production moves to a more advanced stage, ¯rms would have a
stronger incentive to substitute intermediate inputs for labor. Given the patterns of responses in
consumption and employment and consistent with our intuition, under SLCP, there's a short-run
fall in home household's utility for small values of N, and a rise for a large enough N; and the
foreign household's utility rises for all values of N. It is particularly interesting that, under BLCP,
while the home utility rises in the short-run for all N; the foreign utility falls on impact and, when
N becomes larger, the initial fall is dampened and even reversed in subsequent periods.
Figure 4 plots the responses of the home country's terms of trade at various stages of processing
under the two alternative currencies of price-setting, where we ¯x N = 12. As we move from a less
advanced stage to a more advanced stage (i.e., as n rises), the deterioration in the terms of trade
under sellers' local currency pricing tends to be dampened, while the improvement in the terms of
trade under buyers' local currency pricing tends to be reduced on impact and even reversed in the
subsequent periods. To understand what drives the reversal in the terms of trade under BLCP,
we plot in Figure 5 the home country's export price indices and import price indices at various
stages of processing, where all prices are in home currency unit. The ¯gure reveals that export
prices fall (in foreign currency unit) and the fall becomes more pronounced at a more advanced
stage, whereas import prices rise and rise by less at a more advanced stage. The adjustments in
export prices are more sluggish than those in import prices. In particular, at the end of the price
contract period when all ¯rms have had a chance to set new prices, import prices adjust quickly
to the new steady state, while export prices adjust more gradually and it takes longer periods
for export prices to adjust to the new steady state. Therefore, the reversal in the terms of trade
adjustments is mainly driven by the relatively more sluggish adjustments in export prices. The
16Let © denote the share of total intermediate goods in gross sales across all stages. Since the steady-state





1¡(Á=¹)N . From the BEA's 1997
Benchmark Input-Output Tables, the value of © is about 0:7 in the U.S. manufacturing sector.
19reversal in the terms of trade in turn drives the reversal in foreign's utility °ows under BLCP, as
reported in Figure 3.
Since it is only the changes in consumption but not necessarily changes in employment in each
country that increase with N, each country's welfare is an increasing function of N. Since the
terms-of-trade movement tends to be dampened as the number of stages increases, the welfare
gains in the two countries tend to become less dependent of the currencies of price-setting. The
welfare gains in the calibrated model are plotted in Figures 6 and 7. If prices are rigid in sellers'
local currency unit (Figure 6), the home monetary expansion has a \beggar-thy-self" e®ect when
there is a single stage of production and trade; yet, when N rises above 3, both countries experience
a welfare gain. If prices are rigid in buyers' local currency unit (Figure 7), the monetary expansion
is a \beggar-thy-neighbor" instrument for small values of N; but when N rises above 5, both
countries gain from the expansion. Under either currency of pricing, the home welfare is more
sensitive than the foreign welfare to changes in the number of processing stages.17
6. Conclusion
The welfare consequence of international monetary policy transmission has been a frequent topic
in academic writing and popular press since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, and it
continues to be such nowadays, as is manifested by the ongoing debate concerning the recent and
potential future movements in the exchange rates of the Dollar against other major currencies
such as the RMB (Yuan) and the Euro. An important ¯nding from the welfare analysis in the new
open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) literature is that an independent monetary expansion
typically generates two types of externality associated with international trade in goods and assets,
an \aggregate-demand externality" that tends to make all countries better o® through improving
the production e±ciency in each country and a \terms-of-trade externality" that tends to make
one country better o® but its trade partner worse o®. Since the con°ict-of-interest terms-of-trade
e®ect tends to dominate the common-interest e±ciency-improvement e®ect for many reasonable
parameter values in the standard NOEM models where all production of and trade in goods occur
in a single stage, which country is the one that is better o® and which is the one that is worse o®
generally depend on the currencies of price setting.
Given that it is the con°ict-of-interest terms-of-trade externality that generally determines
the welfare consequence of independent monetary policy in the standard NOEM models, recent
research has paid much attention to the issue of international monetary policy cooperation and
17In the presence of transportation costs, the world economy would behave less like a closed economy, and it
would require more processing stages for the monetary expansion to be welfare improving for all countries involved.
It would then be an empirical issue to ¯nd out how large N can be in the data, which is an important subject for
future research.
20the design of international monetary institutions and rules that aims at preventing inward-looking
policy actions from generating large terms-of-trade externality. For this purpose, this strand of
literature typically abstracts from the common-interest e±ciency-improvement e®ect associated
with policy-induced reductions in monopolistic distortions.18 It instead focuses exclusively on
the potential gains from coordinating countries' policy actions to internalize the terms-of-trade
externality. Some of the studies ¯nd that, under various speci¯cations of the models' environments
and parameter values, the gains of cooperation can be quantitatively small, and thus the lack of
coordination may not be a big problem.19
The results presented in the current paper are somewhat complementary to the above ¯nding.
We have shown that once an empirically important vertical production and trading chain is
incorporated into an otherwise standard NOEM model, the con°ict-of-interest terms-of-trade
consideration also becomes of secondary relevance, while the only ¯rst-order welfare e®ect is the
one associated with the policy-induced reduction in monopolistic distortions. This suggests that,
with a sophisticated production and trading chain in modern global economy, the terms-of-trade
externality may not be an important source of concerns for pursuing independent monetary policy
and the gains from cooperation or other e®orts in internalizing the terms-of-trade externality
are likely to be small under general conditions. The conclusion that an independent monetary
expansion can be mutually bene¯cial regardless of its source is consistent with Obstfeld and
Rogo®'s (1995) original optimism, but holds for general parameter values and under arbitrary
pricing assumptions in our model with a vertical production and trading chain.
Ample empirical evidence indicates that the vertical structure of production and trade has
already become a de¯ning characteristic of modern world economy. Existing studies also ¯nd that
the multiple border-crossings of goods embodied in such a production and trading structure may
provide a powerful mechanism to account for many empirical facts documented in the literature
in international economics and ¯nance. The present paper explores only a particular aspect of the
international monetary policy transmission in a model that captures this real-world feature. The
model that we have presented in this paper has a rich enough structure that allows one to study
other important issues. For instance, one may consider a version of the model with other types
of shocks, such as productivity shocks, to evaluate the potential bene¯ts of international policy
coordination. One may also study optimal monetary policy rules under alternative monetary
policy regimes such as independent central banks versus monetary union in an open economy
with multiple boarder-crossings of intermediate goods. In light of the empirical evidence and our
theoretical ¯ndings, future research along these lines should be both important and promising.
18For example, Clarida, et al. (2002) introduce production subsidies to o®set the steady-state markup distortions,
while Obstfeld and Rogo® (2002) restrict their attention to policy rules, the commitment to which precludes the use
of unilateral monetary expansion to raise employment and output systematically toward their competitive levels.
19See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogo® (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003), and Jansen, et al. (2004).
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A.1. Proofs of some lemmas and Proposition 1
We ¯rst establish several preliminary results, which will serve as intermediate steps to the proof
of Proposition 1. We ¯rst have
Lemma A.1. Given that mt = 1 and m¤
t = 0 for all t, there is a unique perfect foresight
equilibrium in which
wt = 1; w¤
t = 0; 8t ¸ 0; (28)
et = 1; 8t ¸ 0; (29)
¹ pnt = 1; ¹ p¤
nt = 0; 8t ¸ n; 1 · n · N; (30)
yNt = 0; y¤
Nt = 0; 8t ¸ N: (31)
for all N ¸ 1. These results hold independent of the currency in which prices are rigid. Further,
if prices are set in sellers' local currency, then
pnHt = 1; p¤
nFt = 0; 8t ¸ n ¡ 1; 1 · n · N; (32)
while if prices are set in buyers' local currency, then
pnHt = 1; pnFt = 1; p¤
nFt = 0; p¤
nHt = 0; (33)
8t ¸ n ¡ 1; 1 · n · N:
Proof. According to the home money demand equations (S6) or (B6) (in Tables 1 and 2),
existence of a non-explosive solution to the equilibrium system requires that
¹ pNt + yNt = mt = 1; ¹ p¤
Nt + y¤
Nt = m¤
t = 0; (34)
which, along with the labor supply equations (S5) or (B5), leads to (28). Solving (S7) or (B7)
forward, we obtain (29) . Given (28) and (29), the equations in (32), (33), and (30) can then be
proved by induction, using (S1)-(S4) and (B1)-(B4). Finally, given that (30) holds also for N,
(31) follows immediately from (34). Q.E.D.
This lemma shows that the home monetary expansion immediately raises its nominal wage
rate, but has no e®ect on the foreign nominal wage rate. It also leads to a complete home nominal
exchange rate depreciation. After n periods following the shock, the price index of stage-n goods
in the home country will rise fully and the price index of stage-n goods in the foreign country will
return to the steady state. After N periods, the real e®ects of the shock vanishes and aggregate
demands in both countries return to the steady state.
22The next lemma establishes the patterns of price adjustments across di®erent stages of pro-
cessing under the two alternative assumptions about the currencies in which prices are rigid.
Lemma A.2. Suppose N ¸ 2. If prices are set in sellers' local currency, then the following
inequalities about pricing decisions hold for n 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g:
0 < pn+1;Ht < pnHt; p¤
n+1;Ft < p¤
nFt · 0; 0 · t · n ¡ 1; (35)
On the other hand, if prices are set in buyers' local currency, then the following inequalities about
pricing decisions hold for n 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g:
0 < pn+1;Ht < pnHt; p¤
n+1;Ft · p¤
nFt · 0; 0 · t · n ¡ 1; (36)
p¤
n+1;Ht < p¤
nHt · 0; 0 < pn+1;Ft · pnFt; 0 · t · n ¡ 1; (37)
Under either sellers' or buyers' local currency pricing, the following inequalities about price indices
hold for n 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g:
0 < ¹ pn+1;t < ¹ pnt; ¹ p¤
n+1;t < ¹ p¤
nt · 0; 0 · t · n: (38)
Proof. To prove (35), we ¯rst use (S1)-(S4), along with the solutions wt = 1 and w¤
t = 0
for nominal wages and et = 1 for the nominal exchange rate in (28) and (29), to get a recursive
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[pn+1;Ht + apn+1;H;t¡1 + (1 ¡ a)pn+1;H;t+1] ¡ Á(1 ¡ °);; (40)
where a ´ 1=(1 + ¯). We then prove (35) by induction. It is easy to verify that the inequalities
in (35) hold for n = 1. This establishes the result for N = 2. Now suppose that N > 2 and the
inequalities hold for an arbitrary n 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 2g. Fix an arbitrary t with 0 · t · n. By the
induction hypothesis and (32), we have
pn+1;Ht · pnHt; pn+1;H;t¡1 · pnH;t¡1; pn+1;H;t+1 · pnH;t+1;








with at least one strict inequality if and only if n > 1. Thus, from the recursive relations in (39)
and (40), we have pn+2;Ht < pn+1;Ht and p¤
n+2;Ft < p¤
n+1;Ft. This completes the proof of (35).
23The proof of (36) and (37) is similar. In particular, note that (B1), (B2), and the solutions
for nominal wage rate and the nominal exchange rate together imply that
p¤
nHt = pnHt ¡ 1; pnFt = p¤
nFt + 1: (41)
Thus, (37) will be an immediate corollary if we can establish (36). To prove (36), we follow a
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[pn+1;Ht + apn+1;H;t¡1 + (1 ¡ a)pn+1;H;t+1];; (43)
Then, the inequalities in (36) can be proved by induction.
Finally, the inequalities in (38) follow from the de¯nitions of the price indices in (S4) or (B4),
and the inequalities in (35) or (36)-(37). Q.E.D.
Lemma A.2 shows that the home monetary expansion leads to a rise in the home prices at
each processing stage but a fall in the foreign prices. Further, at a more advanced processing
stage, the rise in the home prices becomes more gradual and the fall in the foreign prices becomes
more pronounced, and the movements in the prices become more persistent.
It follows that, as the number of stages increases, the home price level will rise more gradually
and the foreign price level will fall by a greater magnitude. Given the money supply process in the
two countries, the price adjustment patterns imply that real aggregate demands in both countries
will rise by a larger magnitude when the length of the production and trading chain grows. This
is essentially the result in Proposition 1 in the text.
Proof of Proposition 1. It follows immediately from (34) and (38). Q.E.D.
A.2. Employment dynamics with multi-stage production and trade
To obtain the welfare e®ects of monetary shocks, we need to obtain a solution to aggregate
employments, which, in our model with multiple stages of production and trade, requires a few
intermediate steps. We now describe the solution procedure. Labor market clearing implies that














The sectoral employments are given by
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24where Yn(j) = YnH(j)+Y ¤
nH and Y ¤
n(j) = Y ¤
nF(j)+YnF(j) for all j 2 [0;1] and all n 2 f1;:::;Ng.
The demand functions for individual varieties (i.e., YnH(j), YnF(j), etc.) are given by (13) and
(14) and their foreign counterparts.
To solve for aggregate employment dynamics, we ¯rst solve for sectoral employments and
sectoral outputs. Since we can obtain solutions to the price indices, consumptions, nominal
wages, and exchange rates using the results established in Lemmas 1 and 2, we shall now relate
sectoral employments and outputs to these variables.
We begin with outputs and focus on log-linearized equilibrium conditions. Denote by ¹ Ynt =
R 1




nt(j) the linear aggregates of sectoral outputs in the two countries. Then,
using (13) and (14) and the relevant steady-state conditions, we obtain a recursive relation in ¹ ynt
and ¹ y¤
nt given (in log-linearized form) by
¹ ynt = °[´(¹ pnt ¡ ¹ pnHt) + (1 ¡ Á)(wt ¡ ¹ pnt) + ¹ yn+1;t] +
(1 ¡ °)[´(¹ p¤
nt ¡ ¹ p¤
nHt) + (1 ¡ Á)(w¤
t ¡ ¹ p¤
nt) + ¹ y¤
n+1;t]; (45)
¹ y¤
nt = °[´(¹ p¤
nt ¡ ¹ p¤
nFt) + (1 ¡ Á)(w¤
t ¡ ¹ p¤
nt) + ¹ y¤
n+1;t] +
(1 ¡ °)[´(¹ pnt ¡ ¹ pnFt) + (1 ¡ Á)(wt ¡ ¹ pnt) + ¹ yn+1;t]; (46)
for all n 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g. For stage N, we use (4)-(5) and their foreign counterparts to get
¹ yNt = ´°(1 ¡ °)[¹ pNF ¡ ¹ pNH + ¹ p¤
NF ¡ ¹ p¤
NH] + °ct + (1 ¡ °)c¤
t; (47)
¹ y¤
Nt = ´°(1 ¡ °)[¹ p¤
NH ¡ ¹ p¤
NF + ¹ pNH ¡ ¹ pNF] + °c¤
t + (1 ¡ °)ct; (48)
Sum up ¹ ynt and ¹ y¤
nt to get
xnt = (1 ¡ Á)[wt ¡ ¹ pnt + w¤
t ¡ ¹ p¤
nt] + xn+1;t; n 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g (49)
where xn = yn +y¤
n. For stage N, the corresponding conditions are given by xNt = ct +c¤
t. Since
we can solve for the consumption and thus xNt once we obtain solutions of the price indices using
the results in Lemmas 1 and 2, we can then solve for xnt by iterating on n using (49).
To solve for ynt, we rewrite (45) as
¹ ynt = ´°(1 ¡ °)[¹ pnFt ¡ ¹ pnHt + ¹ p¤
nFt ¡ ¹ p¤
nHt] + (1 ¡ Á)[°(wt ¡ ¹ pnt) + (1 ¡ °)(w¤
t ¡ ¹ p¤
nt)]
+(2° ¡ 1)¹ yn+1;t + (1 ¡ °)xn+1;t; n 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g; (50)
from which, we can solve for ¹ ynt by iterating on n, given the solutions of xnt and ¹ yNt.20
20Under SLCP, we have ¹ pnFt = et + ¹ p
¤
nFt and ¹ p
¤
nHt = ¹ pnHt ¡ et, so that the terms in the ¯rst square bracket in
(50) can be reduced to ¡2¿nt, where ¿nt = ¹ pnHt ¡et ¡ ¹ p
¤
nFt denotes the home country's terms of trade. This is not
true under BLCP.
25Upon obtaining ¹ ynt, it is straightforward to obtain the sectoral employment lnt, since cost-
minimizing implies that
lnt = Á(¹ pn¡1;t ¡ wt) + ¹ ynt; n 2 f2;:::;Ng; l1t = ¹ y1t: (51)
Aggregate employment is then a weighted average of sectoral employments given by lt =
PN
n=1 anlnt,
where an = Ln=L is the steady-state ratio of employment in sector n to aggregate employment.
A.3. Equilibrium dynamics and welfare with a single stage of processing
We now derive the equilibrium dynamics of consumption and employment that are used to com-
pute the welfare measures in the special case with N = 1.
We begin with the case where prices are set in sellers' local currency. As we have established in
Lemma A.1, home aggregate demand rises fully while foreign aggregate demand stays unchanged
in response to the unilateral home monetary expansion (see (34)). It then follows from the
optimal price-adjustment patterns described in (32) that consumptions are given by c0 = °=2,
c¤
0 = (1 ¡ °)=2, and ct = c¤
t = 0 for all t ¸ 1.
To obtain the employment dynamics, we note that, in the case with N = 1, employment in
the home country is given by lt = ¹ y1t, as described in (51). Then, it follows immediately from
(47) and (48) that
lt = ¡2´°(1 ¡ °)¿t + °ct + (1 ¡ °)c¤
t; (52)
l¤
t = ¡2´°(1 ¡ °)¿¤
t + °c¤
t + (1 ¡ °)ct; (53)
where ¿t = ¹ p1Ht¡ ¹ p¤
1Ft¡et denotes the home country's terms of trade, and ¿¤
t = ¡¿t is the foreign
counterpart.
Under buyers' local currency pricing, the pricing decisions described in (33) imply that the
consumption dynamics are given by c0 = 1=2, ct = 0 for all t ¸ 1; and c¤
t = 0 for all t ¸ 0. Given
the consumption dynamics, we can obtain employment dynamics under BLCP from equations
(47), (48), and (51). Speci¯cally, we have l0 = °=2, l¤
0 = (1 ¡ °)=2, and lt = l¤
t = 0 for all t ¸ 1.
Once we obtain the dynamics of consumption and employment, it is straightforward to solve
for the welfare measures de¯ned in (21), where we use (27) to obtain the steady-state value of
·L = 1=¹ when N = 1. These calculations lead to the expressions of welfare measures in (22)-(23)
under SLCP and in (24)-(25) under BLCP in the text.
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29Table 1. Equilibrium Conditions under Sellers' Local Currency Pricing
Home Foreign










(S2) Unit costs: vnt = Á¹ pn¡1;t + (1 ¡ Á)wt, v¤
nt = Á¹ p¤
n¡1;t + (1 ¡ Á)w¤
t
(S3) Price indices: ¹ pnHt = 1





(S4) Price levels: ¹ pnt = °¹ pnHt + (1 ¡ °)[¹ p¤
nFt + et], ¹ p¤
nt = °¹ p¤
nFt + (1 ¡ °)[¹ pnHt ¡ et]
(S5) Labor supply: wt = ¹ pNt + ct, w¤
t = ¹ p¤
Nt + c¤
t
(S6) Money demand: xt = (1 ¡ ¯)mt + ¯Etxt+1, x¤
t = (1 ¡ ¯)m¤
t + ¯Etx¤
t+1
(xt ´ ¹ pNt + ct), (x¤
t ´ ¹ p¤
Nt + c¤
t)
(S7) Nominal exchange rate: et = (1 ¡ ¯)(mt ¡ m¤
t) + ¯Etet+1
(S8) Real exchange rate: qt = ct ¡ c¤
t
30Table 2. Equilibrium Conditions under Buyers' Local Currency Pricing
Home Foreign




















(B2) Unit costs: vnt = Á¹ pn¡1;t + (1 ¡ Á)wt, v¤
nt = Á¹ p¤
n¡1;t + (1 ¡ Á)w¤
t
(B3) Price indices: ¹ pnHt = 1





¹ pnFt = 1





(B4) Price levels: ¹ pnt = °¹ pnHt + (1 ¡ °)¹ pnFt, ¹ p¤
nt = °¹ p¤
nFt + (1 ¡ °)¹ p¤
nHt
(B5) Labor supply: wt = ¹ pNt + ct, w¤
t = ¹ p¤
Nt + c¤
t
(B6) Money demand: xt = (1 ¡ ¯)mt + ¯Etxt+1, x¤
t = (1 ¡ ¯)m¤
t + ¯Etx¤
t+1
(xt ´ ¹ pNt + ct) (x¤
t ´ ¹ p¤
Nt + c¤
t)
(B7) Nominal exchange rate: et = (1 ¡ ¯)(mt ¡ m¤
t) + ¯Etet+1
(B8) Real exchange rate: qt = ct ¡ c¤
t
31Figure Legends
Figure 1: The international production and trading structure
Figure 2: The impulse responses of consumption, employment, and utility °ows
under sellers' local currency pricing
Figure 3: The impulse responses of consumption, employment, and utility °ows
under buyers' local currency pricing
Figure 4: The impulse responses of the home country's terms of trade
Figure 5: The impulse responses of the home country's export price index and import
price index under buyers' local currency pricing
Figure 6: Welfare gains under sellers' local currency pricing




































































































Figure 2:|The impulse responses of consumption, employment, and utility


























































Figure 3:|The impulse responses of consumption, employment, and utility










































































































































Figure 5:|The impulse responses of the home country's export price index









































































Figure 7:|Welfare gains under buyers' local currency pricing